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We present theoretical and empirical results on consumption during an
unemployment spell. The theory model extends the conventional intertemporal
allocation model to take explicit account of the fact that households buy clothing and
small durable goods (such as pillows and plates) that are indivisible, irreversible and
non-collateralisable. The theoretical analysis suggests that liquidity constrained agents
cut back on expenditures on these small durables during a low income spell much
more than would be suggested by the income elasticities of these goods in ‘normal’
times. Conversely, non-durable expenditures flows are much smoother than would be
predicted in a model without durables. Thus it seems that agents can smooth utility
flows even when total expenditure (on durables and non-durables) is quite volatile.
The implications of this model are compared to the implications from three other
widely used models of intertemporal allocation.
In the empirical section, we exploit the information in a new Canadian panel
survey of 20,000 workers who separated from a job in 1993 or 1995. As well as
conventional survey information, this survey includes expenditure and asset
information. Administrative data from several sources are linked to this panel to
provide a detailed picture of the circumstances of households in which one member
is unemployed. We estimate a joint total expenditure and demand system and test
whether either the level of total expenditure or the structure of demand are sensitive
to differences in the Unemployment Insurance benefit rate. We find that they are for
households who have no liquid assets. Of the models that we consider, only the
intertemporal allocation model proposed in this paper is consistent with this finding.1
1.  Introduction.
How do agents smooth consumption (if, indeed, they do)? In particular, how do poor agents
smooth consumption over income losses due to an unemployment spell? It seems unlikely that they
do this by running down liquid assets since they typically have very little in the way of such assets.
Equally, it seems implausible that they will run up significant debts even if they can find someone to
lend to them. In this paper we suggest an alternative and examine its empirical plausibility using a
survey of unemployed persons. The smoothing mechanism we suggest is that agents adjust the timing
of replacement of clothing and small durables (such as plates, pillows, cd’s etc.) to their income flow.
The common features such durables and clothing share are: they all exhibit some durability (relative
to a planning period of, say, one month); there are no significant transactions costs for purchases; they
are indivisible; there is an element of irreversibility in that there are very imperfect second hand
markets for such goods and they are not typically collaterisable. Although our theoretical analysis
concerns such ‘small durables’ we conjecture that similar findings apply to ‘large’ durables if these
have a significant down-payment requirement - strictly if the down-payment exceeds the current
service flow. 
Our suggestion is that agents in temporarily straitened circumstances put off replacing, say,
a winter coat until they have 'some more money'. Although there is a welfare loss to replacing small
durables or clothing at a non-optimal time, this welfare loss is typically of second order importance
when compared to the loss from postponing the purchase of non-durables (such as food or heating).
Thus we posit that agents who are temporarily down on their luck (formally: with current income
below permanent income) will choose to postpone replacing a worn but serviceable winter coat rather
than go hungry. Given discretion over the timing of replacement of clothing and small durables,
agents will display considerable volatility in their total expenditures and yet still 'smooth' welfare flows
from the purchase of non-durables and the flow of services from durables by concentrating
expenditures on non-durables (and the replacement of small durables that are broken) during times
of temporarily low income. For example, if expenditures on clothing and 'small durables' are normally
about 15% of total expenditures (a figure suggested by budget surveys) then households can
temporarily reduce total expenditures by this amount without experiencing any fall in utility levels.
Of course, this postponing cannot continue indefinitely but it is an option for the short and medium
run. 
We refer to the hypothesis that agents draw down stocks of durables during a temporary spell
of income loss as the 'internal capital markets' hypothesis to distinguish it from the more usual
'external capital market' hypothesis that is given in textbook treatments of the standard intertemporal
allocation problem. It is important to emphasize two things. First, this is not an alternative to the
standard intertemporal model but it does emphasize the inadequacy of examining only expenditures
on non-durables when we analyze intertemporal allocation. The second point is that the internal
markets hypothesis can be motivated by assuming that agents are liquidity constrained but this is not
necessary. That is, it may be that some agents choose to smooth by varying the timing of small
durables purchases even if they can borrow at non-prohibitive rates. In our theoretical model we show
that the presence of liquidity constraints makes postponing clothes and small durables more likely.2
     
1 This is for all durables excluding clothing.
There is some evidence in favour of the hypothesis set out above. One of the obvious
predictions of the 'internal capital markets' hypothesis is that we should see more volatility in
expenditures on small durables and clothing over the business cycle than we do for non-durables. This
is widely known to be the case; for example, Attanasio (1997, Tables 5 and 6) presents an analysis
of the variability in income and expenditures on different categories of goods for the U.S. in the
1980's and early 1990's. He finds that the variance of log income is higher than the variance of log
nondurable consumption but lower than the variance of log durable expenditure.
1  Even more
importantly, in our context, he shows that durables are considerably more volatile (relative to income
volatility) for low education households than for high education households. This is consistent with
the view that low education/low wealth/high discount factor households are more likely to
synchronize their durables expenditures to income fluctuations. Another prediction of the internal
capitals markets hypothesis is that households that have a member who is experiencing a spell of
unemployment will temporarily cut back on clothing and small durables. Browning and Meghir (1991)
find that ‘prime age married’ households in which the husband is unemployed have a budget share
for clothing that is about two thirds of the budget share for households in which the husband is
employed. Although this could be due to non-separabilities between demands and labour force status,
the magnitude of the difference is striking. A further prediction of the internal capital markets
hypothesis is that agents will adjust their expenditure patterns to small but predictable changes in
income. Parker (1996) presents evidence from the U.S. that agents do exactly this. He considers the
change in net income that arises each year for workers who reach their maximum Social Security tax
withholding during the year. When the maximum is reached the tax stops and the agent receives a
higher net income for the rest of the year. Parker finds strong and robust evidence that agents do
indeed spend more when their income increases, even though this change is predictable. Moreover,
the effect is quite large with an elasticity of about one half. More importantly, from our viewpoint,
there is no effect on `food at home' expenditures, there is a modest but significant effect for
'entertainment and personal care' and a strong effect on clothing expenditures. The latter have an
elasticity of about 2.5.
There are, of course, alternatives to the 'internal capital markets' hypothesis. The alternatives
we consider in this paper are:
C the standard life-cycle model with no frictions: agents borrow or lend on a perfect capital
market and set all expenditures so as to equalize the expected marginal utility of expenditure
over time (we shall follow Browning and Lusardi (1996) and refer to this as the 'standard
additive' model);
C 'rule of thumb' behaviour: some agents set consumption equal to current income (or some
fraction of current income);
C  the life-cycle model with capital market imperfections: agents try to keep the marginal utility
smooth but are constrained in the capital market, usually by higher or prohibitive interest rates3
for borrowing. This leads to lower expenditures on all goods, including non-durables.
To distinguish between these hypotheses with data on expenditures on non-durables and services has
turned out to be a formidable task (see Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Deaton (1992) for surveys).
The usual route is to look for 'excess sensitivity' of non-durable (or food) expenditures changes to
anticipated income changes. Detecting such changes is, however, difficult since the changes in income
that are typically exploited to generate 'anticipated' income changes are small and noisy. Ideally we
would like a sample of households that experienced large and exogenous income changes to
overcome these problems. Moreover, a finding of excess sensitivity, by itself, does not distinguish
between the 'rule of thumb' and 'liquidity constrained version of the life-cycle' model. This requires
supplementary information on, for example, asset levels (see Zeldes (1989)). Even worse, a finding
of 'excess sensitivity' is consistent with the standard additive model if agents have a significant
precautionary motive (see Carroll (1993)).
In this paper we consider simultaneously the determination of total expenditure (on all goods)
and the structure of demands. For the latter, we focus on the differences between expenditures on a
non-durable good (food at home) and clothing. The basic idea is that if any of the three alternatives
to our internal capital markets hypothesis holds then the structure of demands conditional on total
expenditure should be uncorrelated with transitory fluctuations in income (whether these are
anticipated or not). If, on the other hand, agents do synchronize clothing purchases with income then
we should expect to see an effect from income changes on clothing even when we condition on total
expenditures. In the theory section (section 3) we discuss in greater detail the predictions from the
four models. This leads on to tests of the four alternatives that can be implemented on the data we
have.
Our empirical tests rely heavily on the effects of cross-sectional variations in Unemployment
Insurance (UI) benefit levels on the structure of demand as well as the level of total expenditure.
Most tests of alternative models of intertemporal allocation use only one good (`food' or `nondurable
consumption'). Hamermesh (1982) and Parker (1996) discuss how changes in transitory income affect
demands for individual goods. On the face of it they seem to present different effects. Hamermesh
notes that if agents cut back on total expenditure then there will be a bigger proportional impact on
luxuries; this is the standard uncompensated response. Parker (1996), on the other hand, suggests that
agents who are temporarily constrained will cut back more on goods that exhibit high intertemporal
substitution since the utility cost of fluctuations in these is lower than for goods which are not
substitutable over time. In Browning and Crossley (1999) we show formally that the Hamermesh and
Parker effects are identical (if within period preferences are additive); that is, luxuries have a high
intertemporal substitution elasticity. This is an exact form of Pigou's Law (see Deaton (1974)). This
is very distinct from our explanation which emphasizes instead the discretion agents have in the timing
of replacement of small durables and clothing.
The data source we use is the Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP); section 2 gives
a description. The COEP  is a sample of all Canadians who had a job separation in specified time
windows in early 1993 and early 1995. The useful sample size is about 20,000 people. The survey4
itself collects detailed information on the job from which the worker separated (the ‘reference’ job);
search behavior; labor force participation since the job loss; family circumstances; personal and
household income; assets; expenditures on a range of goods and total expenditure and a number of
other variables. This is then merged with Unemployment Insurance (UI) administrative data (including
eligibility for UI  benefits and past labor supply information) and current and past earnings
information on the respondent and their spouse (if any). Thus these data give an unusually detailed
picture of the circumstances of unemployed people and their household. For our purposes, the most
important aspect of this is that we have information on expenditures and a sizable proportion of the
sample experienced a spell of unemployment with an associated loss of income. Often the latter is
large so that we are not so troubled by the signal extraction problem. Moreover some part of the
income fall varies exogenously over our sample (in particular due to changes to the Unemployment
Insurance system over our sample period) so that we can obtain consistent IV estimates of the effects
of interest.
We estimate a (partial) demand system for food at home and clothing. This 'structural'
approach is the natural complement to the 'reduced form' approach of Gruber (1997) and Browning
and Crossley (1998). The reduced form approach most directly answers the immediate policy
question: to what extent does expenditure during an unemployment spell depend on UI benefit levels.
By contrast, we can provide insight into why expenditure levels depend on benefit levels and who is
most affected. Besides being of interest in the wider literature on consumption and saving, this is also
critical for the design of UI systems which must balance the incentive losses from higher UI benefits
against the enhanced insurance given by higher UI benefits and the welfare gains that result for
unemployed people and their families. Moreover, as we show below, our approach allows us to
address which goods are particularly efficacious in identifying the reduced form effects. Our data are
very different to the PSID in this context. First, all of our sample had a job separation so we have
relatively large sample sizes. Second, we have exact details of any UI benefit payments (from the
administrative data). Third, we have expenditure measures on food at home, clothing and housing and
also a total expenditure measure. Finally, the UI program design (and changes in it over our sample
period) give exogenous sources of variation in transitory income. Against this, the survey design
forced on us that the first interview could only take place five to eight months after the job loss so
that some of the information we use for the pre-job separation period is retrospective. This
disadvantage is partially offset by the availability of  administrative data going back some years before
the survey. In the end, the most serious missing data is on expenditure levels before the job loss to
control for the marginal utility of money in the pre-separation period. All we have in this way is a
survey measure of the change in total expenditure from before the job separation. In a companion
paper (Browning and Crossley (1998)) we use this information to examine the effects of benefit levels
and assets on the total expenditure change but this cannot be used to examine the specific (demand)
effects we examine in this paper. 
When considering consumption during an unemployment spell there are three broad impacts
of a job separation on expenditures to take into account. First, if there are costs of going to work then
we would expect to see total expenditure fall and also to see a fall in such specific work related items
as transport and clothing. More generally, if preferences over goods are not separable from labour5
     
2 Canadians are also eligible for social assistance benefits, which are of unlimited duration.
These benefits depend on family type and other measures of need rather than past earnings or
contributions. There is a means test (on assets) and a high implicit tax on earnings. 
supply (see Browning and Meghir (1991)) then a change in labour force status will induce changes
in total expenditure and also in the structure of demands conditional on that total. We control for this
in our empirical work by considering only respondents who are unemployed so that they all have the
same work status.
The second effect comes about because a job loss is often an unpleasant shock and can be
expected to lower desired lifetime consumption. This impacts on both durable and non-durable
expenditures. Agents will typically wish to run down stocks of durables by letting them depreciate
so that we should expect to see lower levels of purchases of durables (or more zeros) after a job loss.
There will also be a corresponding fall in non-durable expenditures. These effects can be thought of
as ‘permanent’ job loss effects.
Finally, the temporary loss of income due to being out of work may lead to lower total
expenditure. This is certainly the case if agents use a 'rule of thumb' or if they are liquidity
constrained, either of which will cause the marginal utility of expenditure to fluctuate in an anticipated
way from period to period. Our alternative suggestion is that agents may display a sensitivity of
current total expenditures to transitory and anticipated income flows and still keep the marginal utility
of expenditure approximately constant (that is, they 'smooth' consumption defined as the consumption
of non-durables plus the flow of services from durables). They do this by reducing expenditures on
small durables and letting these depreciate beyond the optimal level (even allowing for the permanent
shock). 
In the next section we discuss our data source. In section 3 we present a simple two good
theoretical model to illustrate the idea that with stochastic income the timing of the replacement of
durables will, under some circumstances, be highly correlated with income changes even though the
latter have no informational content (that is, there is no permanent component). This model considers
only two goods, one non-durable and one durable, so it is not a serious candidate as a basis for
empirical work but it does bring out the essence of our internal capital markets hypothesis. In section
4 we discuss the econometric issues that arise in our estimation. Section 5 contains the results and
section 6 concludes.
2.  The Data.
2.1  The Canadian Unemployment Insurance System .
The Canadian Unemployment Insurance (UI) program provides earnings related benefits of
limited duration
2 to unemployed workers who qualify by having worked at least the minimum
required number of weeks is the previous year. In recent years, the minimum number of  weeks6
     
3The previous legislative changes were in 1989.
     
4The federal department responsible for unemployment insurance.
worked required to qualify has depended on local unemployment rates  and ranged from 10 to 20
weeks. The duration of benefits has depended on both local unemployment rates and the number of
weeks worked in the year prior to the unemployment spell and could be up  to one year. Benefits are
a fixed fraction (the statutory replacement rate) of earnings in the 20 weeks prior to the
unemployment spell up to the maximum insurable earnings. For example, in 1992 the statutory rate
was 60% and the maximum insurable earnings was $710/week, so that the maximum weekly benefits
were $426. The system is financed by payroll taxes.
In our data period there were two sets of important legislative changes to the Canadian UI
system
3, in 1993 and in 1994. These changes were introduced and enacted as Canada came out of the
1991 recession. Broadly, the two Acts were intended to finance a cut in payroll taxes (as a job
creation strategy) while keeping the program’s budget under control. The 1993 changes cut the
statutory replacement rate from 60 to 57 percent of insurable earnings and disentitled individuals who,
according to Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC)
4, either voluntarily quit their jobs or
were dismissed with cause. Prior to this, ‘quitters' were penalized by a 12 week waiting period and
had their statutory replacement rate cut from 60 to 50%.  
Four further changes to system were introduced in 1994. This reform raised the minimum
entrance requirement in high unemployment regions from 10 to 12 weeks (effective July, 1994). It
contained a further cut in the statutory replacement rate (from 57% to 55%, also effective July,
1994). There was also a revision in the mapping from weeks of work and unemployment rates into
weeks of benefit entitlement (effective April 1994). Finally, a  new “dependency rate” was introduced.
Individuals with dependent children and low insurable earnings (less than $390 per week) became
eligible for a statutory replacement rate of 60%. This change was intended to shield poor families
from the 1993/4 cuts in the general statutory rate. It also represented somewhat of a change in the
philosophy of unemployment insurance in Canada since previously benefits had been tied strictly to
contributions and not to need. 
2.2  The Canadian Out of Employment Panels.
 To evaluate the impacts of the 1993 reform, HRDC commissioned a panel survey of
individuals that separated from jobs in windows before and after the reform came into force on April
3
rd, 1993. To avoid issues of strategic filing, the windows were separated from the effective date of
the bill by about one month. Each window was about 6 weeks long. This survey  has come to be
called the 1993 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP).  Respondents from the first sampling
window constitute “cohort 1" and those from the second window constitute “cohort 2". Because the
cohorts span the policy change, the data has a “quasi-experimental” structure.
In Canada, employers are required to submit  a Record of Employment (ROE) whenever a7
job separation occurs. Approximately 6 million such forms are issued each year. The sampling frame
for the COEP is the population of individuals receiving an ROE form in one of the two window
periods, and having a Social Insurance number that ends with a particular digit. We refer to the job
whose end led to an individuals inclusion in our sampling frame as “the reference job”. The ROE form
contains a reason for separation. All reasons were sampled except for  participation in a Work
Sharing program, apprenticeship, and retirement at age 65. Approximately 6,000 separations were
sampled in each window.
Each respondent was interviewed by phone three times, at about 26, 39 and 60 weeks after
the reference job separation. The average interview length was 25 minutes for the first interview.
Subsequent interviews were shorter. The long lag to the first interview is imposed by the time it takes
all the administrative records that form the sampling frame to become available. This lag means that
only a selected sample of respondents are observed in unemployment; we return to this issue below.
This survey information is then merged with UI administrative information from HRDC and
with administrative earnings data from the current and previous years for the respondent and his or
her spouse (if married). Thus these data give an unprecedentedly detailed glimpse into the
circumstances of households that contain someone who has separated from a job. For example, the
administrative data gives the exact benefit and entitlement period for every respondent; these are
usually very badly measured in surveys (or imputed from state level averages). Conversely the
earnings data allow us to control, for example,  for the labour supply and income of the spouse which
is typically missing from administrative data. Finally, the survey provides information concerning
expenditures, search measures, demographics, and other variables  that are never observed in
administrative data. Moreover, there are often  two or three independent measures of the same
quantity in the multiple data sources (an example is past earnings) which allows for the correction of
measurement error. 
In 1995,  HRDC commissioned a second survey of individuals separating from jobs. The 1995
COEP sampled approximately 4000 ROE’s in each of two windows, timed to roughly correspond
to the 1993 sampling windows. We refer to these samples as cohorts 3 and 4. There were no policy
changes between cohorts 3 and 4, so they provide a seasonal control for cohorts 1 and 2. In addition,
cohorts 2 and 4 provide a before and after framework for the evaluation of the 1994  policy changes.
In the 1995 COEP, respondents were only interviewed twice, at approximately 36 and 60 weeks.
Sampling of separation reasons was more restricted than in 1993 with further minor categories
excluded; the only groups sampled had separations because of ‘short work’, ‘voluntary quit’,
‘dismissal’,  ‘illness’ and ‘other’. The survey questionnaire was revised somewhat in light of the
experience with the 1993 COEP, but considerable care was taken to ensure backwards comparability.
2.3  The Sample.
While the 1993 and 1995 COEP together comprise some 20,384  respondents (12,490 in
cohorts 1 and 2 (1993) and 7,894 in cohorts 3 and 4 (1995)), we work with a sample which is
restricted in several important ways. First, we restrict the sample to separation reasons "short work"8
     
5That is, we exclude both the employed and those that report withdrawal from the labour
market.
(about  50% of separations), "voluntary departures"  or “quits” (almost 20%) , “dismissals” (some
5%) and the approximately 20 percent labeled "other". These last represent the second largest single
category of separations. Discussions with HRDC staff suggest that this group is similar to the “short
work” group; our investigations support this and we commonly pool them. This leaves us with 11,228
observations from cohorts 1 and 2 and 7,573 observations from cohorts 3 and 4.
Second, we focus on respondents between the ages of 20 and 60. This reduces the 1993
sample to 10,528 and the 1995 sample to 7195. In addition we select respondents from three family
types: singles, couples and couples with children and/or others. Single parents and young individuals
living with parents or unrelated adults are the primary groups excluded. Though these latter groups
are not unimportant, we found in preliminary analysis that it was difficult to adequately capture the
heterogeneity of responses in a pooled sample. Furthermore, the quality of responses to questions
about household income and expenditure were very poor among respondents living with parents or
unrelated adults. The family types we do consider comprise 6,750 respondents in 1993 and 5,676 in
1995
Finally, we focus on those individuals who are unemployed
5 at the time of the first interview:
this is the group who are likely to have current earnings below “permanent” earnings, and for whom
UI benefits (if any) provide a good measure of current ‘earnings’. Of course, because the first
interview occurs some time after the separation date this cuts down our sample size: we have 3,132
respondents in 1993 and 1,557 respondents in 1995. This selection introduces a possibility that our
results will be biased by sample selection; we discuss this below.
In addition to these sample selections, our estimating sample is further reduced because we
are forced to discard observations for which the expenditure information is missing or inconsistent
and observations which do not have a complete set of information. This leaves us with a final sample
of 1,959  respondents (1162 in 1993 and 797 in 1995). The incidence of incomplete records is quite
high, but this reflects the fact that we are merging data from four sources (the survey responses, plus
three different HRDC administrative files). We consider it the acceptable cost of the very rich set of
information we are able to use.
In Table A2 in Appendix A we present some summary statistics both for our sample and for
a sample of workers who report being back in a steady job at least as good as the one that they
separated from. Below, we will use the latter group for two purposes. First, we use them to correct
for a survey design flaw; see the next sub-section. Second, we use them to test for the exogeneity
of our instruments.
2.4  The expenditure questions.
One novel feature of the survey information is that we ask questions concerning expenditures.9
In 1993 we ask about housing costs (weekly or monthly), food at home (weekly), food outside the
home (weekly), clothing (monthly) and total expenditure on everything (monthly). In 1995 the survey
period for food inside the home and outside was changed to monthly. The food at home, clothing and
total expenditure variables  constitute our ‘left hand side’ variables. In particular we are interested
in how the level of total expenditure and the structure of demand varies with the UI benefit level.
Since the use of expenditure questions outside expenditure surveys is relatively rare there is a concern
about the reliability of the responses. To address this we investigated  the expenditure patterns for
households in which the COEP respondent is back in what is self-reported to be steady employment
at a job at least as good as the old one. These responses were compared to data drawn from the 1992
Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX) which provides high quality information on household income
and expenditures. The conclusion from this analysis is that we are recording something like the ‘true’
values (albeit with noise and considerable rounding). For example, for the COEP we find that even
when we control for current and lagged household income and a wide range of other variables, family
size has a highly significant effect on both total expenditure and food expenditures. Moreover this
effect is very similar to the effect found in the FAMEX data. Below we shall present additional
evidence that our consumption information seems quite reliable.
We also have to address a serious problem in our survey design. As noted above, the survey
period for food at home is ‘weekly’ in 1993 and ‘monthly’ in 1995. It is tempting to take the 1993
figure and simply multiply it by 4.2 to make it comparable to the 1995 figure. However, there is
considerable evidence that increasing the survey period for self-reported expenditures lowers the
figure reported once the responses are scaled to a common period, see Deaton and Grosh (1997).
This is a problem for us since we use the policy variation between 1993 and 1995 to help in the
identification of the effects of changing benefit levels. Since this may be confounded with spurious
changes in reported  expenditures on food at home, using the unadjusted figures could lead to serious
bias. To overcome this, we conducted an analysis of the ‘food at home’ demand pattern for those
back in a ‘good’ job (the group referred to at the end of the previous sub-section). The results
indicate that the 1993 food at home figure needs to be scaled down by about 13% to compensate for
the change in survey design; we make this correction everywhere below.
3.  Theory.
3.1  A Model of Durable Replacement and Nondurable Consumption.
 
In this section we derive the implications of the four hypotheses concerning intertemporal
allocation. The purpose here is not to rigorously analyze a structural model of the internal capital
markets hypothesis but rather to derive the qualitative implications of each of the alternatives which
can then be tested for on a joint system of demands and total expenditure. There is not, in fact, any
theoretical model of the joint determination of expenditures on non-durables and small durables in
the literature. The closest we know of is the model of purchase of nondurables and the control of a
durable with a resale price discount of Beaulieu (1993) (see also Eberly (1995)). This model has a
nondurable good and a durable good which has to be replaced if the agent wishes to change the stock,
with the current stock being sold at a discount. The agent has a financial asset which has a stochastic10
     
6 It will become clear that allowing for first order positive auto-correlation in the earnings
stream will strengthen our conclusions so that the iid case is a reasonable one to consider.
     
7 In an earlier version of this paper, we also allowed for quality choices. Although this allowed
for some interesting effects, here we report only the basic results with a single quality. 
c%d.p # X (1)
return but no other source of income; thus assets are always positive. The optimal solution displays
the characteristic feature of control models with asymmetric control possibilities, namely that there
are upper and lower threshold ratios of durables to assets. The agent does not adjust durables if the
ratio is strictly between these thresholds. If, however, the durables-asset ratio hits the lower threshold
then the agent buys some durables (and conversely).
Although the Beaulieu model is suggestive it does not allow us to address directly the effects
of, say, current earnings being below 'permanent' earnings (because there is no non-capital income)
nor can it allow for the possibility of liquidity constraints (since the agent always maintains positive
assets). Nonetheless, this paper and the results in other models with fixed costs and/or partial
irreversibility (for example, Eberly (1995), Bertola and Caballero (1990) and Grossman and Laroque
(1990)) do suggest some conjectures. To supplement these we present some results from numerical
simulations of a fairly rich model that is tailored to the context considered here; some of the details
follow Adda and Cooper (1996). We emphasize that this is only a 'worked example' to illustrate the
effects that can arise; no attempt is made to 'calibrate' this example to realistic values for parameters
or income processes. Equally no attempt will be made in this paper to estimate the exact structural
model presented here.
In our discrete time model we have an agent who faces an i.i.d. earnings stream (= y t in period
t) but no other uncertainty
6. The agent can lend as much as desired at a given interest rate (r) but
cannot borrow (but note that we find similar qualitative results if we allow the agent to borrow, say,
three periods earnings) . In each period the agent observes the current earnings draw and chooses the
level of consumption of a nondurable (= ct) and whether or not to replace the durable good (  = 1 dt
for replacing, zero otherwise). The agent can only ever own one unit of the durable and the durable
decays in a deterministic fashion.
7  If the agent buys a new durable then the old one is thrown away.
The price of non-durable consumption is normalized to unity and the price of a new durable is p. If
we denote cash-on-hand (assets from the previous period plus earnings) by X, then the credit
constraint gives that: 
That is, nondurable consumption and any purchase of the durable cannot exceed cash-on-hand.11
     
8 Thus we rule out complementarities or substitution between durables and non-durables.
These effects may be important in circumventing some capital market imperfections if, for
example, the goods are substitutable and durables can be financed by borrowing against the
collateral. 
lnc % 0exp(&a(D) with 0 $ 0, D $ 0 (2)
Xt%1 ’ (1%r)(Xt & ct & p.dt) % yt%1 (3)
J(X, a) ’
max(maxc [lnc % 0exp(&a(D) % $E(J((1%r)(X&c)%y ),a%1))],
maxc [lnc % 0 % $E(J((1%r)(X&c&p)%y
),1))])
We assume that within period preferences are additive over the nondurable and the durable
8
and that the utility from the latter depends only on the age of the good (= a $ 0). Specifically, within
period utility with a non-durable consumption level of    and a durable of age a is given by:   c
Thus a new (a = 0) durable yields a utility level of 0. Cash-on-hand evolves according to: 
The state variables are (X, a) and the control variables are (c, d). For an infinite horizon program with
a discount factor of $  (< 1) we have the following recursive form for the value function:
where E is the expectations operator for the earnings process  . Thus the agent computes the value y )
for replacing and not replacing and chooses the action with the highest value. If the agent replaces
then the durable is one period old next period, otherwise it is  periods old. (a%1)
This model has both irreversibility (in fact, the old durable has to be discarded) and
indivisibility (in fact, only one unit of the good is ever held). Both elements are important for our
analysis. For example, in a neo-classical durables model with a continuous stock of the durable that
can be added to or run down in a continuous fashion the effects we display below are absent. The
irreversibility makes the replacement decision an option; in low income states agents will be reluctant
to exercise this option since it will yield low values of the non-durable if the next period income is
also low. As set up, our model requires that all of the cost of the durable be paid at replacement; this
is appropriate for goods such as socks and pillows. We conjecture that we could replace this
assumption with a partial down-payment requirement so long as the down-payment is larger than the
‘current service flow’ from the new durable. Given this, we see that our model is also applicable to
large durables such as televisions (but note that this is a substitute for non-durables such as going to
the cinema) so long as agents do not use ‘no money down - no payments for a year’ schemes to
finance these purchases and circumvent the liquidity constraint. 
For the continuous time, perfect certainty analogue of our model we can derive exact12
     
9There is a trade-off in choosing the interest rate. Low values (0.005, say) give a closer
approximation to continuous time but convergence is slower. The rate chosen (1%) is obviously
rather high if the decision period is a month but lower values gave similar qualitative results and
were much slower.
p ’ 0.5, D ’ 0.5, 0 ’ 0.5
solutions for the consumption and replacement policies. In fact, the optimal strategy is a simple
renewal policy for impatient agents. Thus agents choose a fixed replacement period, consume and
save optimally during this period to accumulate just enough to pay for the durable and then set assets
back to zero at the time of replacement. For the discrete case with certain income the policy is the
same except that the (fixed) replacement period is integer valued. For this policy, we can show that
for the range of parameters and variables taken below the two goods have income elasticities very
close to unity. That is, if income is varied in such a way that average total expenditure rises by one
percent then average expenditures on the non-durable and the durable both increase by very close to
one percent. This is desirable in the current context since we do not want to consider Hamermesh-
Parker necessity/luxury effects.
For the case of uncertain income we need to resort to simulations. Conventional value
iteration methods (with error bounds and Gauss-Seidel improvements, see Puterman (1993), for
example) can be used to derive the value function and the decision rules   and  . From c(X, a) d(X, a)
these we simulate time paths for consumption and the purchases of the durable. Specifically, we give
the agent some starting level of assets and a new durable and then follow them for 11,000 periods
with the earnings process used in the determination of the decision rules. From these we calculate
various statistics of interest from the last 10,000 outcomes.
In our simulations we always take the same values for the interest rate and the durable
characteristics. We shall only examine the effects of varying the discount factor and the income
process. Specifically, for the durable we take: 
Earnings takes values (2,1,2-2) with probabilities (0.1,0.8,0.1) so that mean income is constant at
unity. The ‘replacement ratio’, 2, runs from 0.45 to 0.95. Thus the durable costs half of normal
earnings. Finally, we take a value of 0.01 for the interest rate
9. For the utility parameter values we
take either $ =0.99 or 0.98; these correspond to a patient and an impatient agent, respectively. With
these parameters the durable is replaced once every three periods in the case when income is certain
; thus the average budget share is about 0.16 (= p*frequency) which is close to the empirical (2’1)
value observed for clothing and small durables in budget surveys.
In Table 2.1 we present the ratio of average expenditures when the agent is in the low income
state relative to expenditures in the medium income state. We do this for the first period of low
income (the top figure in each cell) and for subsequent periods of low income (the bottom figure in
each cell). The first panel presents results for an impatient agent. There are two salient features of
these results. First, in very low income states non-durable expenditures are lower than in the normal13
     
10 Note that sample sizes are relatively small for the low income state (about 1000 for the first
period and about 130 for longer spells) so that the ratios are somewhat noisy and display what is
probably spurious non-monotonicity. 
income state, but not by as much as income. For example, with a replacement rate of 50%, food is
cut by 12% in the first low income period and by an average of 30% in subsequent periods in longer
low income spells. On the other hand, durables are cut back a lot, particularly in long spells. Thus,
a halving of income causes average expenditures in the first period of a low income spell to fall to
only 42% of average expenditures in the normal income state. For longer spells the effect is very
strong and replacement of the durable almost ceases. The second important feature of these results
is that both expenditures rise with the replacement rate but non-linearly for durables
10. In particular,
durable expenditures fall sharply when the income fall equals the average budget share of durables;
that is, at a replacement rate of about 85%. The results for total expenditure follow from the two
component series: total expenditure is cut by about 20% in the half-normal income state and rises
fairly sharply at a replacement rate of about 0.8 to 0.85. 
TABLE 2.1: AVERAGE EXPENDITURE RATIOS
IMPATIENT ($=0.98, r= 0.01)
Income 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
Nondurable 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.96
0.67 0.70 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.93 0.94 0.94
Durable. 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.85 1.02 0.98
0.05 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.57 0.31 0.43 1.16
Total 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.91 0.95 0.97
0.57 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.75 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.98
PATIENT ($=0.99, r= 0.01)
Income 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
Nondurable 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.98
Durable 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.95 1.03 1.09 1.10 1.04 0.97 0.92 1.01
0.86 1.15 1.01 0.76 0.94 0.92 1.23 1.08 1.01 0.80 1.03
Total 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.99
0.95 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.98 1.03 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.99
Ratio of income and average expenditures in low income state to normal income state. The top value is for the first period of low income and the
bottom for longer spells.
Turning to the patient agent we see that the level of benefits has virtually no effect on
expenditures on either non-durable nor durables expenditures. Patient agents accumulate sufficient14
assets to buffer themselves against any income fluctuations. Readers familiar with the ‘income
fluctuation problem’ (sometimes called the ‘buffer stock’ model) will recognise many of these features
except that here the stock of the physical asset and assets accumulated to pay for the replacement of
the durable play the role of the ‘buffer stock’ for impatient agents.
Although suggestive, these simulation results do not have immediate implications for empirical
work since we cannot divide our sample according to subjective discount rates. Instead we shall split
our sample on the basis of assets at the beginning of a low income spell. Thus in Table 2.2 we present
results from regressions that split the sample into three groups: those with starting assets that are too
low to replace the durable; those with assets above this but below the one period normal income and
those with higher assets. These split points taken are somewhat arbitrary but they allow us to capture
the major features of the responses to benefit differences across agents. To allow for the fact that
durables are not usually replaced (‘infrequency’) these regressions are (non-linear) regressions of
expenditures on the exponential of linear functions of the low income value, this value multiplied by
a dummy variable for being in a low income state and the level of assets at the beginning of the period
for non-low income spells and the level of assets at the beginning of the low income spell for low
income states. We discuss the infrequency estimator in the empirical section below.
TABLE 2.2: BENEFIT EFFECTS 
BEGINNING OF PERIOD ASSETS 
Low (< 0.5) Medium (0.5 - 1) High (> 1)
Non-durable -4.0% -1.2% -0.0%
Durable -39.6% -15.9% -1.5%
Total -8.7% -4.5% -0.3%
Percentage change in expenditure in the low income state for a change in the replacement rate from 60% to 50%.
The values presented are the differences in average expenditures in the low income state
between an agent with a replacement of 60% and another agent with a replacement rate of 50%. This
represents a ‘cut’ in low income of about 15% so that a marginal propensity to consume of unity
would give that total expenditures fall by 15%. The results here mirror those from Table 2.1: for low
asset agents food is cut only a little but durables are cut back dramatically. For the medium assets
group there is still some effect but it is attenuated. For the high asset group (who are largely, but not
exclusively, the patient agents) there is no significant impact of income in the low income state on
expenditures. 
Although they are highly simplified, our simulation results do suggest some qualitative
implications. First, total expenditure is sensitive to the level of low income for agents who have low
assets at the onset of a low income spell. Second, food expenditures are much less volatile than
income or total expenditure and are relatively insensitive to changes in the replacement rate from 60%
to 50%, even for low asset agents. Finally, we see that durables expenditures are highly sensitive to
changes in the replacement rate for low asset agents. In particular, the changes in expenditures on
non-durables and durables are very different from those we would predict from the change in total15
     
11 Including net equity in housing rather than a dummy for ownership did not change any of
our results.
expenditure and the income elasticities in the normal income state. The latter are both close to unity
in our model so that we would predict that all expenditures would change in about the same
proportion if there were no replacement effects. It is this sharp difference in prediction between a
conventional Marshallian model and our replacement model that provides the basis for our tests
below.
3.2  Controlling for heterogeneity.
We now present an empirical model that is designed to capture some of the features identified
in the last subsection. Take the month to be the planning period and denote the expenditure on good
i in the month by xi and total expenditure in the month on all goods (including housing, durables,
clothing, services and non-durables) by x. We model these expenditures as a function of three distinct
sets of variables. The first set consists of  the variable of interest, the level of UI benefits (denoted b).
If the cross-sample variation in this was uncorrelated with all other determinants of expenditures then
we could identify the benefit effect  simply by looking at how expenditures vary with benefits.
Benefits are, however, correlated with a host of the other determinants of expenditures and we have
to control for these. The second set of controls we use are household demographics that are widely
believed to affect consumption and demand. These include the age of the agent, the number of people
in the household and their labour force status and the season the household was surveyed. Let  y
denote the vector of such demographics; see Table B1 in Appendix B for a full listing. The third set
of variables, denoted z,  are associated with controlling for three other broad facets of the
determination of consumption: pre-separation lifetime wealth (strictly, the marginal utility of money);
the size of the job separation shock and the selection in our data that agents have a relatively long
unemployment spell. We discuss each of these separately.
The principal determinant of cross-section variation in total expenditure is cross-section
variation in lifetime wealth. This is correlated with UI benefits (since the latter depends on the
respondent’s earnings which are correlated with lifetime wealth) so that ignoring this correlation
would lead to a spurious correlation between expenditures and UI benefits. To control for this, we
include the respondent’s earnings and household income in the three years before the reference job
separation and assets at the separation in our set of  z-variables. We also include education, home-
ownership
11, age and occupation. Note that some of these are also included in the set of
demographics so that identification of their effects is problematic; here this is not a problem since our
principal interest is in the benefit variable.
Given these correlates for the pre-separation marginal utility of money, we next include
variables that are designed to capture how big a lifetime shock the job separation represents. For
example, workers who are laid off from a ‘good’, long tenure job may experience  a considerable long
term loss in earnings (see Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993)). At the other extreme, separation
from a seasonal job gives much less of a lifetime earnings shock. Thus we include variables such as16
tenure in the reference job and whether the latter was seasonal in our set of controls. Since these are
correlated with the benefit received, ignoring them would lead to endogeneity bias. One further
variable that we include here is how important the respondents’ earnings were for the household
before the reference job separation. Fairly obviously, the loss of a job by the principal bread-winner
represents more of a household shock than the loss of a job by someone who only brought in, say,
20% of household income. 
Finally, we come to the selection on being unemployed at the first interview. The time
between the reference separation and the first interview varies between 14 and 44 weeks. There are
two aspects to this: the average time is quite long and also variable. The first of these means that most
of our respondents have had a relatively long unemployment spell. Thus it may be that our estimates
of what happens to any worker who separates and then experiences a long spell of unemployment
may be biased since the sample selection is correlated with duration. There are two competing
selection scenarios that are commonly adduced here. The first corresponds to the view that
unemployment is a demand phenomenon. For example, in a search model there may be unobserved
heterogeneity in the arrival rates of job offers. In this scenario, ‘marginal’ workers with low
employment opportunities are more likely to have long spells and hence to be unemployed at the first
interview. If such workers also have few financial resources then they may be more sensitive to the
level of UI benefits. In this case our estimates overestimate the impact of UI benefits on consumption.
The second view is that unemployment is in some sense a choice, having either an element of search
or labour supply. For example, there may be unobserved heterogeneity in the alternative value of time
or in search costs. Thus workers who are observed to have a longer spell are those who can ‘afford’
it; needy workers will be driven to take worse jobs and hence to drop out of our sample. In this case
the estimates we have are an underestimate of the impact of UI benefits on consumption for a worker
drawn from the population at large who is forced to have, say, a six month unemployment spell. 
The second aspect of the selection problem is that there is  variation in the time between the
separation and the first interview which may induce a spurious correlation between consumption
levels and benefit levels. This derives from the consensus view that there is a significant but small
positive effect of benefits on unemployment duration (see, for example, Atkinson and Micklewright
(1991), Meyer (1990) or Narendranathan and Stewart (1993)). If this is correct then this induces a
correlation between the benefit level and the weeks elapsed between the reference job separation and
the first interview. If the latter is itself correlated with consumption levels during the unemployment
spell then later interviews will be associated with lower consumption and higher benefits. Moreover,
if there is consumption duration dependence then the inferences we draw below refer to what happens
to a household in which someone has an unemployment spell of between 14 and 44 weeks. We cannot
extrapolate outside this support to infer what happens in a short spell or a very long one. 
If the second problem did not exist then we could use the time between separation and
interview as an instrument to solve the first problem. Unfortunately we have to control for the second
problem by including this ‘weeks elapsed between the reference separation and the first interview’
variable so that this exclusion restriction is not available. Instead we pursue two alternative strategies.
First, without attempting to distinguish between the demand or supply side hypotheses, we note that17
     
12 These are not genuine Frisch functions since they do not condition on the marginal utility of
expenditure but rather on determinants of the latter. This is not ideal nomenclature but the
obvious alternative of calling these demands ‘reduced form’ is not appropriate since below we
shall be instrumenting the benefit level.
ln(x) ’ g(b, y, z) (6)
ln(xi) ’ f i(b, y, ln(x)) (7)














both concern unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated across duration and consumption. Thus we
simply include variables to capture both sets of effects. For example, to control for demand side
effects we include the local unemployment rate and a variable  for having had some unemployment
in the two years before the reference job separation. To capture supply side heterogeneity we include
variables such as assets at the separation and household characteristics. Thus we have a large number
of variables to wash out correlations between our benefit variable and the error terms in the
expenditure equations. Second, we have what we consider to be a good instrument for the benefit
level which further mitigates any sample selection bias.
3.3  Implications of the competing allocation models.
Given our three sets of independent variables, denoted  , the joint system determining (b, y, z)
the expenditure variables is given by the consumption function:
and the Marshallian (uncompensated) demands:
If we substitute (6) into (7) then we have what we refer to the quasi-Frisch
12 demands:
The four allocation models we consider each have different implications for the effects of changes in
the benefit level in the quasi-Frisch system (6) and (8) and for the Marshallian system (6) and (7). To
facilitate the comparisons we define:
so that the   are quasi-Frisch benefit effects, the   are Marshallian benefit effects and the   are ))s J)s ,)s
income elasticities. From equation (8) we have the following relationship between the quasi-Frisch
and Marshallian benefit effects:18
)i ’ Ji % ).,i (10)
) ’ )i ’ Ji ’ 0 (11)
) > 0 ,Ji ’ 0 Y )i ’ ).,i > 0 (12)
Consider first the standard additive model. Here the only effects of an increase in benefit levels
are lifetime effects. First there is a re-distribution effect: those who expect to receive net gains from
the system - presumably those who expect many unemployment spells - are better off and those who
expect to contribute more in the future than they receive in benefits are worse off. There is also an
insurance effect since prudent agents will increase current consumption if the insurance aspect of the
UI system is enhanced by an increase in benefit levels. The unconditional effects of these changes on
current expenditures are likely to be small anyway but since we also include variables such as past use
of UI and age the conditional effects on expenditures can be ignored. Thus we have:
That is, in a standard model with no liquidity constraints there should not be any effect of benefit
levels on either total expenditure or the structure of demands. This corresponds to the patient agent
case in our simulation model (such agents effectively self-insure).
We take the 'rule of thumb' model to imply that changes in current income lead to changes in
total expenditure but not to the structure of demand conditional on this total. That is:
Taking values of, say, 0.4 and 1.3 for income elasticities for food at home and clothing respectively,
this implies that the proportional change in the two goods should be about one half and 1.3 times the
proportional change in total expenditure.
Returning to the standard model, if we introduce liquidity constraints then there is a role for
benefit effects. Agents who are liquidity constrained have a unit marginal propensity to consume out
of current 'cash-on-hand' (see, for example, Deaton (1991)). Thus a one dollar increase in benefit
levels will lead to a one dollar increase in total expenditure and a corresponding increase in all
expenditures, with the exact amount being equal to the product of the expenditure elasticity and the
budget share. This is the same as the  'rule of thumb' model. Indeed, the only way to distinguish these
predictions from a rule of thumb model in which agents set total expenditure equal to income is by
splitting the sample according to some proxy for being constrained (see Zeldes (1989)). In particular,
agents who carry liquid assets forward from one period to the next are not, by definition, liquidity
constrained and hence will obey (11) rather than (12). In our empirical work we allow the benefit
effects to vary with asset levels.19
     
13 In our empirical work we present a test for the adequacy of this somewhat restricted
functional form.
) > 0, Jf < 0, Jc > 0 Y )c > 0, )f >/< 0 (13)
xi ’ x e .i(x, y, b) e
ui (14)
.i ’ (i % "i ln(x) % $i y % 2i b (15)
ln(xf) ’ (f % (1%"f) ln(x) % $f y % 2f b % uf (16)
The common characteristic of the three models above is that the Marshallian demand benefit
effect is zero.  This is not the case for the internal capital markets hypothesis for expenditures on food
at home, clothing and total expenditure. We do not have specific predictions here; all we can present
are suggestions from the simulations reported in the last section which only allowed for two goods,
one durable and one non-durable. These suggest that for those with some assets at the beginning of
the unemployment spell we should see no effect (equation (11) above) but for those with low assets
we have:
Thus changes in benefit levels have an effect on both the level of total expenditures and demands
conditional on total expenditure. This gives an unambiguous prediction for the quasi-Frisch clothing
expenditure effect but the quasi-Frisch food effect can be positive or negative. 
4. Econometric issues.
4.1  Functional Form.
Our choice of functional forms for equations (6) and (7) is partly dictated by the fact that we
have many respondents who report zero for their monthly clothing expenditures. We shall return to
how to handle this infrequency problem below but for now we choose a functional form which
restricts the ‘long run’ expenditures to be positive. This requirement is not met by several of the usual
choices for functional form (for example, the Working-Leser form). Instead we use a log-log form
for the long run Engel curve:
where xi  is the expenditure on good i  and ui is a random error term
13. Such a system will (i ’ f, c)
clearly not satisfy adding-up but since we are only modeling a small subset of goods this is not
considered a serious problem.  We define:
For the food demand equations we can substitute and take logs to give the log-linear form:20
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an interpretation of it as the long run average if all the variables that determine it are held fixed.





with probability p (18)
’ 0 with probability (1&p) (19)
where E(e v) ’ 1 (20)
Note that with this formulation (multiplicative) measurement error in the food expenditure will not
cause identification problems but we do have to take account of measurement error in total
expenditure. Additionally, the total expenditure variable is usually taken to be endogenous in demand
studies so that we need to instrument it. Our parameterisation of equations (6) is:
If the variables on the right hand side here that do not appear in the demand equation (16) (thez
instrumental variables) are uncorrelated with the measurement error then this identifies the parameters
in (16). We cannot, of course, use the transformation in equation (16) for the clothing equation since
we have many zeros for clothing. Thus this equation must be estimated in non-linear form; the next
sub-section presents the details. 
4.2 The Infrequency of Clothing Expenditures.
We now deal with the fact that because our expenditure measure for clothing is for one month
we would have a fair number of zeros even if agents were all following the standard model. In this
case we have a pure 'infrequency' problem and none of the zeros represent corner solutions in the long
run.  If we had a formal theory model for the purchase of clothing we could formulate a formal
statistical model that captured this 'infrequency'. Lacking such a model, the best we can do is to
follow the lead of Keen (1986) and Pudney (1988) and model the infrequency relatively informally
(see Pudney (1989) for an excellent discussion of infrequency models). 
In this context we interpret xc*  as the ‘long run average’ demand for clothing
14 in a particular
employment state. Let p be the probability that an agent buys some clothing in the survey period.
Both p and xc* may be functions of (b, y, z) since agents may adjust both their frequency of purchase
and their long run average purchases according to their current circumstances. Observed purchases
of clothing, xc, are given by:21
     
15Although this formulation is very convenient for incorporation into the system we estimate, it
is inefficient (relative to x there is a lot of noise in xc*). There are more 'structural' alternatives.
These allow us to determine whether, for example, b enters both the 'probability of purchase'
function p and the function xc* (for example, Blundell and Meghir (1987)). We shall not pursue
this further in this paper.
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xc ’ exp((c % (1%"c)ln(x) % $cy % 2cb)e
uc (22)
Thus:
so that the non-linear regression of the observed purchases xc for the whole sample (including those
who have zero purchases):
gives the mean function for the unobservable xc*
15. We estimate the system of equations (16), (17)
and (22) by GMM assuming independence across agents but allowing for arbitrary correlation
between the residuals in these equations.
4.3  Instruments for benefits.
The principle variable of interest in our empirical analysis is UI benefits. Benefits (in $1,000's
per month) were interacted with a dummy for liquid assets at the interview date and a dummy for
positive liquid assets at the interview date which gives two benefit variables for the liquidity
constrained and unconstrained respectively. The dummy for positive liquid assets at the interview date
is among our permanent income controls, y.  To address the possibility that variation in the marginal
utility of money (8) not captured by our controls (y, z) is correlated with benefits, we follow Gruber
(1997) and  instrument actual benefits paid with ‘potential benefits’. Potential benefits are calculated
as a function of past earnings, local unemployment rates, and weeks worked in the reference job.
Parameters of the formula varied over the sample period with both legislative (the 1993 and 1994
reforms) and administrative changes. As we control for past earnings, local unemployment rates, and
weeks worked in the reference job in our regressions, identification is coming from nonlinearity in the
benefit formula and from changes in the program parameters. Because the UI system is federal in
Canada, we cannot use the cross-state variation in benefits which is the common basis of U.S. studies
of UI.
The variation in program parameters we exploit is described in Appendix A, Table A3. The
available variation in the statutory rate is small relative to cross state differences in the US. Against
this, our rich controls and exact measurement of benefits means there is less noise from which to
extract the signal. Furthermore the source of the variation we are using is transparent: a series of22
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17Liquid asset holdings prior to the job separation were recorded in the 1995 survey but not in
1993.
legislative cuts to the UI system designed to reduce program expenditures against the backdrop of
a very slowly improving labor market.
16  Elsewhere (Browning and Crossley, 1998) we point out that
cross-state variation in replacement rates in the U.S. is not obviously exogenous; state replacement
rates might be correlated with the permanent income shock of job separation if, for example, states
adjust their replacement rates to smooth program expenditures (or balance their budgets). 
We also note that not all our instruments move in the same direction through time. While most
of the changes in this period made the program less generous, there were two with the opposite
effect. One was the introduction of the “dependency rate” between cohorts 2 and 3 which allowed
for higher benefits for low income individuals with dependents. The other was the significant real
growth in the maximum insurable earnings over the period, which offset the cuts in legislative
replacement rate. This meant that for individuals above the maximum insurable benefits the actual
replacement rate did not decline. Finally, we note that the relevance and exogeniety of a set of
instruments is subject to empirical investigation; we take this up in section 5.1. 
Because holding positive liquid assets at the interview date is surely endogenous, we
instrument this with a dummy variable for reporting investment income in the previous tax year.
Preliminary analysis suggested that reporting investment income in the previous tax year was a very
good predictor of having liquid assets of at least 2 months income in the month before the separation
date.
17  Potential benefits was  interacted with the two dummies indicating receipt of investment
income and no investment income in the previous tax year. Thus we have three instruments (two
potential benefits variables and the dummy for investment income in the previous tax year) and three
endogenous variables (two benefit variables and the dummy variable for positive liquid assets at the
interview date). 
5.  Results.
5.1  Reduced Forms. 
We begin our empirical analysis with a discussion of several sets of reduced form
relationships. The estimates and related statistics are presented in Appendix B. First we estimate
auxiliary regressions for our three endogenous right-hand-side variables in order to assess the
relevance of our instruments. The estimates are reported in Appendix Table B1. Conditional on our
large set of permanent income and demographic controls, our instruments have good residual
explanatory power. 
The next set of relationships are `reduced-form’ versions of the quasi-Frisch responses23
     
18Gruber also notes that actual UI receipts are very badly measured in the PSID. That is not a
problem with our data. We have exact administrative records of UI receipt. Thus our main results
are for actual benefit receipt.
(equations (16), (17) and (22)). These estimates condition on potential benefits directly, whereas the
structural forms we will subsequently present estimate responses to actual benefits received
(instrumented with potential benefits). The complete estimation results are presented in Appendix B,
Table B2. Column 1 presents estimates for food at home, column 2 clothing and column 3 total
expenditure.  These reduced form versions of the quasi-Frisch equations are of interest for at least
three reasons. First, they provide the basis for a set of robustness and specification tests. Second, they
are most comparable to the estimates of Gruber (1997). Finally, as Gruber points out, the response
to potential benefits is often of most interest to policy makers, as it is potential benefits (rather than
actual benefits) over which they have direct control.
18  Among our results, column 1 is most
comparable to Gruber (1997). We take up the substantive implications of our results for
Unemployment Insurance evaluation and a comparison with Gruber’s results in our concluding
section.
Appendix Table B3 presents statistics pertaining to the empirical fit and adequacy of our
specifications for these reduced form quasi-Frisch equations. Note that the nonlinearity of the clothing
equation precludes us from employing the usual linear regression diagnostics. We get around this
problem by estimating a linear approximation to the clothing equation. The basis of this
approximation is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the clothing expenditures. The inverse
hyperbolic sine allows for zero expenditures. This transformation approximates the logarithm at larger
values of the argument but becomes linear as the argument approaches zero. Since the nonlinearity
of this transformation is scale dependent we scale clothing expenditures here by dollars per month
(rather than 1000s of dollars per month). The first two rows of Table B3 report the estimated
coefficients on the potential benefit variables. Thus in columns 1 through 3 these simply repeat
information that was presented in Table B2. The linear  approximation to the clothing equation
reports benefit effects which are similar to column 3. The third row reports the R
2  for each of the
(linear) regressions. The relatively low R
2 values for clothing regressions simply reflects the fact that
we are fitting the common conditional mean of observed and ‘long run average’ expenditures to the
former, which is much noisier than the latter (see section (4.2)).
The next row of Table B3 presents RESET tests for omitted variables - essentially a test of
the empirical  adequacy of our nonstandard functional form. The test detects no difficulty with our
functional form for total expenditure,  food and clothing. The final two rows of Table B3 report on
the robustness of our estimates. We calculate DFBETA influence statistics for each observation for
each of the two variables of interest, in each of the three equations. These represent, for each
observation, the  change (in standard deviations) in the coefficient on a particular variable that would
result from the removal of that observation (see Chaterjee and Hadi, 1988) . We report the largest
DFBETA (in absolute value) for each coefficient reported in the first two rows of the table; these
statistics indicate that no coefficient estimate seems unduly influenced by any one observation.24
     
19Calculation of the elasticities requires the mean of benefits, while calculations of the dollar
for dollar cuts requires the mean of expenditures. In each case we calculate the mean for UI
recipients only, and separately for recipients with and without liquid assets.
The next set of reduced form relationships which we consider are `reduced form’ estimates
of the quasi-Frisch response for our control sample of respondents back in a good job. These last
estimates provide a test of the exogeneity of our instruments. If potential benefits influence
expenditures only through actual benefits, then they should have no influence on the demands of
respondents who are ineligible for benefits. A similar test is presented in Gruber (1997). Appendix
B, Table B4 presents the results. Note that we cannot use  the food equation for this test, because
this sample was used to calibrate food expenditures across the change in the food expenditure
reporting period between the 1993 and 1995 survey (see section (2.4)). However, the clothing and
total expenditure questions were the same in both surveys, so that we can use them to validate our
exogeneity assumption.  Table B4 shows that potential benefits are not a significant determinant of
either clothing expenditures or totally expenditures among those back in a good job. 
5.2 Estimates of quasi-Frisch and Marshallian responses.
We turn now to an empirical investigation of the four models of consumption behavior
introduced in section (3.2). We begin with the quasi-Frisch responses.  Table 5.1 summarizes our IV
estimates of quasi-Frisch form equations ((6) and (8) above) for food, clothing and total expenditures;
the full estimation results are presented in Appendix C, Table C1. The first row reports the impact
of UI benefits for respondents who had liquid assets at the interview date - that is, the coefficient on
UI benefits crossed with a dummy variable indicating positive assets. The only positive impact is on
clothing expenditures and that is insignificant. The second row reports the coefficient on UI benefits
crossed with a dummy a variable indicating zero liquid assets at the interview - that is, the impact of
UI benefits for those who are more likely to be liquidity constrained. These three coefficients are
strikingly different than those in the row above - there are all positive and significant. Thus the
distinction between the constrained and unconstrained is empirically significant. Comparing these IV
results to our reduced form results of the previous section (Appendix C, Table C2), we note that the
reduced form estimates display a similar pattern of much stronger responses for clothing than for food
our total expenses. However, the distinction between the constrained and unconstrained is weaker
in the reduced form estimates. This reflects the fact that we are using less information to classify the
respondents’ asset status. 
Evaluated at means of the data, our IV results imply the following elasticities.
19 For those with
some assets at the interview date, the elasticity of food expenditures to benefit levels five to eight
months into an unemployment spell is -0.088; for clothing 0.396 and for total expenditure -0.079.
While the elasticities for food and total expenditure have the `wrong’ sign, they are not significantly
different from zero. For those without any liquid assets the elasticities are food: 0.198, clothing:
0.844 and total: 0.244.  Cast in terms of elasticities, the difference between food and clothing
responses is striking, with the clothing response more than four times as large. If instead we calculate25
the implied dollar for dollar cuts (again at the means of the data) our results suggest that among those
likely to be liquidity constrained a 1 dollar cut in benefits would lead to a 7 cent cut in food
expenditures, a 8 cent cut in clothing expenditures and a 38 cent cut in total expenditures. Even
though the budget share of clothing among our unemployed sample is only about a quarter of the
budget share of food (see Appendix A, Table A1), the much larger elasticity of clothing outlays
implies that a 1 dollar cut in benefits results in a larger absolute fall in clothing expenditures than in
food expenditures.
Next we turn to the responses of the Marshallian demands to UI benefits.  The coefficients
on the two benefit  variables are presented in the first two rows of Table 5.2. Because the system is
recursive, the total expenditure coefficients are of course, identical to those reported in 5.1 (the quasi-
Frisch demand coefficients). For food and clothing, these are the conditional on x (total expenditure)
derivatives - the impact of benefits on the structure of demand  - holding total expenditure constant.
According to these estimates, there is no significant effect of benefits on food expenditure, once we
condition on total expenditure. The same is not true of clothing expenditures. Conditional on total
expenditures, marginal benefit dollars appear to increase clothing expenditures. Of the alternative
models of consumption behavior discussed in section 2, only the “internal capital markets” hypothesis
is consistent with this observation.
The third line reports the estimated total expenditure elasticities for food and clothing. These
are precisely estimated, the food expenditure elasticity is much smaller than the clothing elasticity and
both numbers are consistent with the numbers typically estimated by budget surveys. The complete
estimation results for the Marshallian responses are presented in Appendix C, Table C2.  Since we
have several instruments for total expenditure, the system is overidentified and the Sargan statistic
provides an (asymptotically P
2) test of the overidentifying restrictions. As can be seen from the 3
rd
note to Table 5.2, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected.
TABLE 5.1: IV Estimates of  Coefficents on UI Benefits























1. t-values in square parentheses
2. 1,959 Observations
3. Full results in appendix C, table C1
4. Expenditures are measured in ln($1000s)  per month; Benefits are measured in $1000s per
month.
5. (Actual UI Benefits) x (Positive Assets at Interview) is instrumented with (Potential UI
Benefits) x (Positive Investment Income the Year Prior to Job loss).
Finally we have estimated reduced form versions of the Marshallian responses (that is,
conditioning on potential benefits directly rather than instrumenting actual benefits with potential
benefits). When we condition on potential benefits, we can estimate the responses for the employed
sample as well as the unemployed sample. The results of this exercise are presented in Appendix C,
Tables C3 and C4 for the unemployed and employed samples respectively. Three important
observations can be drawn from these tables. First, Table C3 reveals that among the unemployed, the
pattern of Marshallian responses to potential benefits is very similar to the IV estimates of Table 5.2;
conditional on total expenditure there is no response for food; there is a strong response for clothing;
and that response is stronger among those more likely to be liquidity constrained. Second, Table C4
reveals that among the employed there is no response of the structure of demand to potential benefits.
This follows the our discussion of Appendix B, Table B4 (subsection 5.1) in confirming the
exogeneity of our instrument (potential benefits). Finally we note that the expenditure elasticities for
the reduced form Marshallian estimates for the employed sample are very similar to the structural
form elasticities for the unemployed sample; this is encouraging since this is an implication of all the
theory models.
5.3 Tests of Alternative models
Now we turn to direct tests of the models of consumption behavior discussed in section (3.3).
An inspection of Table 5.2 allows us to anticipate the formal tests: the presence of some significant
benefit effects for total expenditure rules out the standard model and the differences between those
with assets and those without argues against the rule of thumb model. Finally, the fact that benefit
has a significant impact on one component of demand, clothing, argues against the liquidity constraint
model. Using  minimum P
2 steps we impose the restrictions implied by each model (see equations (11)
to (13)) on the Marshallian structural form coefficient estimates. Tests of these restrictions are
reported in Table 5.3. The standard additive model has the strong implication that benefits should not
matter anywhere. To test this we exclude both benefit variables from all three expenditure equations.
This set of six restrictions is strongly rejected by the data. The “rule of thumb” model implies that
benefits should have no effect on the structure of demand (that is, should not appear in the
Marshallian demands for food and clothing), regardless of liquidity. We also take it to imply that the
impact on total expenditure should be the same for those with and without assets. This set of five
restrictions is also strongly rejected by the data.27
TABLE 5.2: IV Estimates of Selected Coefficients
Marshallian Responses, Unemployed Sample






















1. t-values in square parentheses.
2. 1959 Observations.
3. Over-identification of expenditure instruments (Sargan Statistic): P
2
(8) =6.04 ; p =0.64 .
4. Full results in Appendix C, Table C2.
5. Expenditures are measured in ln($1000s)  per month; Benefits are measured in $1000s per
month.
6. (Actual UI Benefits) x (Positive Assets at Interview) is instrumented with (Potential UI
Benefits) x (Positive Investment Income the Year Prior to Job loss).
Allowing for liquidity constraints changes the predictions of the standard model. Benefits may
affect total expenditure for the constrained. However, clothing and food are affected only through
the impact on total expenditure and their respective expenditure elasticities - there is no impact on
the structure of demand. Thus we exclude both the benefit variables from the food and clothing
structural equations and the “high assets” benefits variable from the total expenditure equation. The
test is ‘marginal’ for this set of 5 restrictions. Finally, the “internal capital markets” hypothesis allows
that benefits might affect both total expenditure and the structure of demand (conditional on total
expenditure). Under the additional hypothesis that the unconstrained will prefer external to internal
capital markets, these effects should only be evident for the constrained. Thus we test the internal
capital markets hypothesis by excluding the “high assets” benefit variable from all three structural
equations. The data does not reject these three restrictions.
TABLE 5.3: Tests of Alternative Models
Model P
2 Statistic Degrees of Freedom Probability
Standard Additive 21.4 6 0.0015
Rule of Thumb 17.9 5 0.0030
Liquidity Constraints 9.24 5 0.1028
Internal Capital Markets 2.20 3 0.53
Notes:
1. The restrictions corresponding to each model are discussed in the text.
 
To summarize, benefits appear to have an effect on the structure of demand, conditional on
total expenditure. This is consistent with the idea that agents in temporarily straitened circumstances
smooth consumption by adjusting the timing of durables purchases. Our priors, partly informed by
the simulations of Section 3,  were that this behavior should be much more prominent among those
without liquid assets at the job loss and the data does support this conjecture. Benefits appear to have
a significant effect on the pattern of demands only for the liquidity constrained. Based on the
restrictions derived in section 2.2, our data rejects the liquidity constraints model only at the 10
percent level. Although this may be considered a marginal rejection, note that this is a test against the
completely unrestricted specification of the Marshallian demands. Since the internal capital markets
model is nested within the liquidity constraints model we can test the former against the latter; the
difference in the minimized differences is 7.04 which has a P
2(2) distribution; this indicates clearly that
the internal capital markets model is, statistically, the preferred model.
6 Conclusions.
In this paper we have examined how households might smooth ‘consumption’ over income
losses due to an unemployment spell. We proposed that they adjust the timing of the replacement of
small durables to the timing of income. Because old but serviceable durables continue to provide a
flow of services, such a strategy minimizes the utility cost of a medium run cut in expenditures. The
plausibility of such a strategy is confirmed by simulations. Furthermore, we find support for it in data
from a survey of unemployed Canadians. In particular, marginal dollars of unemployment insurance
benefits tend to increase clothing expenditures even conditioning on total expenditures. The same
is not true of expenditures on a nondurable good, food at home.
While the primary focus of this paper is to evaluate the proposed smoothing mechanism, the
results do have  several interesting implications for UI evaluations. First, they imply a methodological
point about how one should measure living standards during an unemployment spell, and second, the
results - particularly the reduced form and IV quasi-Frisch responses (Appendix Tables B2 and C1) -
do represent a set of inputs to the evaluation of Unemployment Insurance of the type reported by
Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (1998). We take up the methodological point first. 
Our results suggest that the aspect of expenditure behavior on which the researcher should
focus will depend crucially on the research question motivating the analysis. If the goal is
Unemployment Insurance evaluation, our results suggest that, over the short to medium term,  the
sensitivity of  food expenditures to benefit levels (as measured by Gruber (1997)) will provide a
superior guide to benefit adequacy and the welfare costs of unemployment.  If the allocation
mechanism suggested in this paper is correct, then the impact of benefit levels on food (at home)
understates the welfare costs of an income loss since this is the good  that is least sensitive to income29
     
20 Direct comparisons with the results of Gruber (1997) are difficult since Gruber uses the sum
of food at home and food in restaurants and regresses the change in total food expenditures on the
potential replacement rate (potential benefits divided by lost wages). For a sample that includes
both permanent and temporary layoffs, Gruber considers the effect of a ten percentage point cut
in the replacement rate. Since replacement rates in the U.S. are low this represents a large cut in
the benefit (specifically, a 25% cut in benefit if the original replacement rate is 40%). Gruber’s
estimates suggest that such a cut would lead to a (further)1.75% fall in total food expenditures.
This estimate is a mixture of the response of those with assets and those without, so the
comparison figure to our ‘no assets’ group is likely to be a good deal larger but still modest. This
is in line with our results.
cuts. However, the postponement of durables replacement will lead to total expenditure movements
which are associated with only second order welfare costs, so that total expenditure movements may
substantially overstate the welfare costs of income loss. Of course, these arguments make the timing
of expenditure information in the unemployment spell crucial. The non-replacement of small durables
may have second order welfare costs in the short to medium run, but those costs are likely to rise as
old durables  depreciate. If the research goal is instead to test for liquidity constraints, food
expenditures will provide very little power because such nondurable goods will be preferentially
smoothed.  An examination of changes in total expenditures (as in Browning and Crossley, (1998))
or demand patterns, including the demand for small durables (as presented in this paper) offers a more
powerful test. 
Turning now to what our results actually say about optimal UI, we believe that they have two
essential aspects. That first is that the mean responses are small. They are certainly much smaller than
the one-to-one responses that seem to be assumed in much of the popular policy debate. In this regard
our results are in line with the findings of Gruber (1997).
20 Second, the responses, while small, are
nonetheless heterogeneous. The elasticity of  total expenditures with respect to benefits is essentially
zero for those who are likely to be unconstrained but around 0.2 for those who are likely constrained.
For clothing the elasticity for those likely to be constrained is more than 0.8 while for the likely
unconstrained it is less than 0.4. This heterogeneity  is very important. It undermines calculations of
optimal benefits via representative agent models such as presented by Bailey (1978) (to which  Gruber
(1997) applies his estimates) or dynamic general equilibrium analyses that assume a representative
agent; see Browning and Crossley (1998) for further discussion.
We have emphasized the internal capital markets models as a smoothing mechanism available
to those without access to external capital markets. Nevertheless, there may be other circumstances
under which households would optimally synchronise durables purchases to income flows. This is
fundamentally a portfolio decision and we speculate that households might choose to do their short
to medium run smoothing with the timing of replacement of durables (real assets) in some
circumstances where there is a premium to holding illiquid financial assets. Such motivations are not
captured by our simulations (which assume a single liquid financial asset with a positive rate of return)
or by our empirical work (which focuses on a group - the unemployed - which is dissaving rather than30
saving). Whether the optimal portfolio involves smoothing via real (durable) assets, and hence the
timing of purchases to income, remains an open question, and is an obvious direction for future
research.31
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Appendices.
Appendix A: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics.  









dummy for positive expenditure




















Demographics  dummy for highschool graduate
dummy for tertiary education 
age  (years/40+0.5)
age squared also included in regressions
log of household size 













dummy for single female
dummy for male with spouse employed at separation
dummy for female with spouse employed at separation
dummy for male with spouse not employed at separation
dummy for female with spouse not employed at separation



















































dummy for home ownership
dummy for some employment between separation and  interview 







fraction of household income provided by ROE job, prior to separation
dummy for separation expected
dummy for seasonal job
dummy for job tenure > 1yr
dummy for managerial occupation














Regular UI use dummy for UI use in previous 2 years 0.60 0.62
Notes: 
1. All monetary amounts (expenditures, incomes and benefits) are measured in 1000s of 1993 Canadian dollars
per month.35










respondent’s income lagged one year
respondent’s  income lagged two years
household income lagged one year
household income lagged two years
respondents earnings in lost job












2. All monetary amounts (expenditures, incomes and benefits) are measured in 1000s of 1993 Canadian dollars
per month.
TABLE A3:  Variation in Potential Benefit Variables.
1. Potential Benefit Formula.
I1t(iwit,,lurit)*I2t(iwit,,lurit)*RRt*max[ieit, miet]
Individual Characteristics:
iwit,: insured weeks in the year prior to separation. 
ieit: insured earnings
lurit: local unemployment rate
Potential benefits is a highly nonlinear function of these individual characteristics. In our expenditure regressions we
condition on iwit,, lurit and a polynomial in  ieit in order to capture correlations of these variables with `permanent income’.
The residual variation in the instrument (potential benefits) comes from the nonlinearity of the potential benefit formula,
and more importantly, the changes to that formula outlined below.
Policy Functions and Parameters:
I1t: indicator function =1 if eligible, 0 other wise.
I2t: indicator function = 1 if weeks of entitlement exceed time between separation and interview.
RRt:  statutory replacement rate.
MIEt: maximum insurable earnings.
2.  Changes in Potential Benefit Formula
RRt:  Statutory rate cut from 60% to 57% between cohort 1 and 2 and to 55% between cohorts 3 and 4. In cohorts 3 and 4
individuals with dependents and low incomes were entitled to a replacement rate of 60%.
MIEt: The maximum insurable earnings rose by 10% in real terms over the period covered by the data. This completely
offset the fall in the statutory rate for those with earnings above the insurable maximum.
I1t:I2t: The mappings from insured weeks and local unemployment rates in qualification and entitlement were reformed.36





dummy for positive liquid assets at interview 












if positive investment income
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TABLE B1:  Unemployed Sample, Auxiliary Equations
Actual Benefits x Positive
Assets at Interview




Potential Benefits  X Positive Investment
Income, Previous Year
0.326     (.04)   0.272     (.041)  0.012     (.038)  
Potential Benefits X No Investment
Income, Previous Year
0.157     (.031)  0.427     (.032)  0.042     (.029)  
Positive Investment Income, Previous Year -0.043    (.052)  0.016     (.053)  0.252     (.049)  
Constant
Importance of Lost Income         
Completed High School   
College
Age      




male, spouse employed at separation
female, spouse employed at separation
male, spouse not employed at separation
female, spouse not employed at separation 
Atlantic 
Quebec   

















Weeks, Separation to Interview         
Local Unemployment Rate
Household Income, 1 year previous
Household Income, 2 years previous 
Respondent Income, 1 year previous
Respondent Income, 2 years previous        
Hhld Inc. previous yr, squared
Hhld Inc. 2 yrs previous, squared    
Ln(earnings in lost job)
ln(earnings in lost job) squared 
ln(earnings in lost job) cubed          
-0.129    (.391) 
0.097     (.053) 
0.021     (.026) 
0.080     (.03)  
-0.012    (.526) 
0.030     (.177) 
-0.023    (.054) 
0.012     (.04)  
-0.052    (.048) 
-0.059    (.061) 
0.001     (.067) 
0.062     (.059) 
0.090     (.064) 
0.032     (.038) 
0.054     (.03)  
-0.008    (.032) 
0.018     (.037) 
0.096     (.025) 
-0.013    (.023) 
0.035     (.023) 
-0.008    (.032) 
0.016     (.026) 
0.018     (.029) 
-0.002    (.03)  
-0.047    (.025) 
-0.067    (.042) 
-0.092    (.072) 
-0.021    (.066) 
0.048     (.044) 
0.066     (.037) 
0.031     (.024) 
0.014     (.023) 
-0.041    (.04)  
-0.006    (.027) 
0.007     (.02)  
-0.060    (.051) 
-0.206    (.068) 
-0.026    (.045) 
0.020     (.045) 
0.021     (.043) 
0.028     (.056) 
-0.085    (.128) 
-0.088    (.317) 
-0.208    (.404) 
0.542     (.055) 
-0.011    (.027) 
-0.082    (.031) 
0.404     (.543) 
-0.156    (.183) 
0.050     (.056) 
-0.022    (.041) 
0.038     (.05)  
0.127     (.063) 
0.158     (.069) 
0.084     (.061) 
0.122     (.066) 
-0.006    (.039) 
-0.020    (.031) 
-0.032    (.034) 
-0.043    (.038) 
-0.072    (.026) 
-0.004    (.024) 
-0.032    (.024) 
-0.034    (.033) 
-0.032    (.027) 
-0.024    (.03)  
0.035     (.031) 
0.067     (.026) 
-0.049    (.044) 
0.047     (.075) 
0.154     (.069) 
-0.036    (.045) 
-0.106    (.038) 
-0.002    (.025) 
-0.062    (.024) 
-0.005    (.042) 
-0.008    (.028) 
-0.033    (.021) 
-0.163    (.053) 
-0.400    (.07)  
-0.048    (.047) 
-0.071    (.047) 
-0.036    (.045) 
-0.104    (.058) 
-0.339    (.132) 
-0.113    (.328) 
-0.170    (.371)  
-0.171    (.05)   
0.045     (.024)  
0.105     (.028)  
0.259     (.498)  
-0.063    (.168)  
-0.087    (.051)  
-0.010    (.038)  
-0.035    (.046)  
0.015     (.058)  
-0.024    (.063)  
0.071     (.056)  
0.102     (.061)  
-0.015    (.036)  
0.039     (.028)  
0.036     (.031)  
0.036     (.035)  
0.111     (.024)  
-0.004    (.022)  
0.036     (.022)  
0.034     (.03)   
0.020     (.025)  
0.046     (.028)  
-0.006    (.028)  
-0.056    (.024)  
-0.025    (.04)   
-0.067    (.069)  
-0.003    (.063)  
0.050     (.042)  
0.050     (.035)  
0.023     (.023)  
0.011     (.022)  
-0.039    (.038)  
0.011     (.026)  
0.016     (.019)  
0.067     (.049)  
0.115     (.064)  
-0.015    (.043)  
0.027     (.043)  
0.006     (.041)  
0.102     (.053)  
0.121     (.121)  
0.024     (.301)  
Notes: Standard Errors in Round Parentheses.39
TABLE B2:  Unemployed Sample,Quasi- Frisch Demands, Reduced Form Estimates
Food At Home Clothing Expenditure Total Expenditure
Constant
Potential Benefits  X +ve Investment Income
Potential Benefits X no Investment Income
Importance of Lost Income         
Completed High School   
College
Age      




male, spouse employed at separation
female, spouse employed at separation
male, spouse not employed at separation
female, spouse not employed at separation 
Atlantic 
Quebec   
Prairies         
British Columbia
















Weeks, Separation to Interview         
Local Unemployment Rate
Household Income, 1 year previous
Household Income, 2 years previous 
Respondent Income, 1 year previous
Respondent Income, 2 years previous         
Hhld Inc. previous yr, squared
Hhld Inc. 2 yrs previous, squared    
Ln(earnings in lost job)
ln(earnings in lost job) squared 
ln(earnings in lost job) cubed          
-1.885 (0.378) 
 0.022 (0.034) 




 0.131 (0.509) 
 0.014 (0.171) 
 0.512 (0.046) 






 0.058 (0.035) 
 0.097 (0.027) 
 0.008 (0.029) 
 0.050 (0.031) 
 0.081 (0.045) 
 0.046 (0.023) 




 0.010 (0.026) 
 0.033 (0.027) 
 0.015 (0.023) 
-0.056 (0.040) 
-0.045 (0.043) 
 0.005 (0.043) 
-0.006 (0.040) 
-0.003 (0.050) 
 0.005 (0.048) 
-0.024 (0.061) 
 0.173 (0.107) 
 0.256 (0.270) 
 0.024 (0.061) 
-0.032 (0.057) 
-0.041 (0.036) 
 0.016 (0.030) 
 0.015 (0.020) 
 0.010 (0.020) 
 0.107 (0.036) 
 0.024 (0.021) 





























































































Notes: Standard Errors in Round Parentheses.40




















































note that clothing is scaled differently41
TABLE B4:  Employed Sample, Quasi-Frisch Demands, Reduced Form Estimates
Food At Home Clothing Expenditure Total Expenditure
Constant
Potential Benefits X +ve Investment Income
Potential Benefits X no Investment Income
Importance of Lost Income         
Completed High School   
College
Age      




male, spouse employed at separation
female, spouse employed at separation
male, spouse not employed at separation
female, spouse not employed at separation 
Atlantic 
Quebec   
Prairies         
British Columbia















Weeks, Separation to Interview         
Local Unemployment Rate
Household Income, 1 year previous
Household Income, 2 years previous 
Respondent Income, 1 year previous
Respondent Income, 2 years previous         
Hhld Inc. previous yr, squared
Hhld Inc. 2 yrs previous, squared    
Ln(earnings in lost job)
ln(earnings in lost job) squared 








































































































































Notes: Standard Errors in Round Parentheses.42
Appendix C: Complete IV results and reduced form Marshallian demands.
In this appendix we present the complete set of estimated parameters from the IV estimates presented
in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. We also present reduced form estimates of the Marshallian demands for both the
unemployed and employed samples. The results are discussed in the text. 43
TABLE  C1:  Unemployed Sample, Frisch Demands, IV Estimates
Food At Home Clothing Expenditure Total Expenditure
Constant
UI Benefits Received  X assets
UI Benefits Received X no Assets
Importance of Lost Income         
Completed High School   
College
Age      




male, spouse employed at separation
female, spouse employed at separation
male, spouse not employed at separation
female, spouse not employed at separation 
Atlantic 
Quebec   


















Weeks, Separation to Interview         
Local Unemployment Rate
Household Income, 1 year previous
Household Income, 2 years previous 
Respondent Income, 1 year previous
Respondent Income, 2 years previous         
Hhld Inc. previous yr, squared
Hhld Inc. 2 yrs previous, squared    
Ln(earnings in lost job)
ln(earnings in lost job) squared 































































































 0.240 (0.089) 
-0.630 (0.070) 
 0.044 (0.023) 
 0.099 (0.031) 
 1.017 (0.510) 
-0.359 (0.174) 
 0.185 (0.049) 
 0.069 (0.035) 
 0.061 (0.045) 
-0.021 (0.056) 
 0.115 (0.058) 
 0.041 (0.051) 




 0.034 (0.032) 
-0.060 (0.042) 
 0.113 (0.030) 
 0.049 (0.021) 
-0.036 (0.022) 
 0.006 (0.029) 
 0.010 (0.022) 
 0.036 (0.025) 
-0.022 (0.026) 












 0.043 (0.041) 
 0.055 (0.035) 
 0.027 (0.024) 
 0.015 (0.022) 
 0.146 (0.036) 
 0.056 (0.023) 
 0.031 (0.018) 
Notes: Standard Errors in Round Parentheses.44
TABLE C2:  Unemployed Sample, Marshallian  Demands, IV Estimates 
Food At Home Clothing Expenditure Total Expenditure
Constant
UI Benefits Received  X assets
UI Benefits Received X no Assets
Importance of Lost Income         
Completed High School   
College
Age      




male, spouse employed at separation
female, spouse employed at separation
male, spouse not employed at separation
female, spouse not employed at separation 
Atlantic 
Quebec   


















Weeks, Separation to Interview         
Local Unemployment Rate
Total Expenditure
Household Income, 1 year previous
Household Income, 2 years previous 
Respondent Income, 1 year previous
Respondent Income, 2 years previous         
Hhld Inc. previous yr, squared
Hhld Inc. 2 yrs previous, squared    
Ln(earnings in lost job)
ln(earnings in lost job) squared 
ln(earnings in lost job) cubed         
-1.644  (0.350)
-0.095  (0.078)
 0.082  (0.057)




 0.245  (0.170)
 0.382  (0.046)






 0.089  (0.033)
 0.135  (0.027)
 0.044  (0.028)
 0.034  (0.031)
 0.117  (0.030)
 0.014  (0.022)
-0.001  (0.020)
 0.011  (0.021)
-0.039  (0.025)
-0.003  (0.022)
 0.001  (0.025)
 0.033  (0.025)
-0.010  (0.023)
-0.063  (0.034)
 0.010  (0.041)
 0.041  (0.042)
 0.022  (0.039)
 0.049  (0.050)
 0.041  (0.047)
 0.048  (0.064)
 0.185  (0.105)
 0.674  (0.255)
 0.577  (0.071)
-0.781  (1.195)
 0.087  (0.259)
 0.587  (0.266)
-0.513  (0.250)
-0.064  (0.076)
 0.067  (0.098)
-4.882  (1.699)
 1.673  (0.585)
 0.582  (0.160)






 0.377  (0.110)
 0.542  (0.095)
 0.228  (0.098)
-0.100  (0.114)
 0.267  (0.121)
 0.020  (0.092)
 0.185  (0.081)
 0.089  (0.081)
 0.198  (0.095)
 0.062  (0.077)
-0.054  (0.092)
 0.195  (0.099)
-0.097  (0.082)
-0.268  (0.113)
 0.647  (0.164)
 0.570  (0.156)
 0.406  (0.145)
 0.624  (0.188)
 0.684  (0.177)
 0.024  (0.247)
 0.062  (0.400)
 1.618  (0.898)
 1.311  (0.299)
-0.545  (0.380)
-0.071  (0.162)
 0.246  (0.089)
-0.636  (0.070)
 0.045  (0.023)
 0.103  (0.031)
 1.013  (0.510)
-0.358  (0.175)
 0.184  (0.049)
 0.065  (0.035)
 0.064  (0.045)
-0.019  (0.057)
 0.118  (0.058)
 0.042  (0.052)




 0.034  (0.032)
-0.060  (0.042)
 0.112  (0.030)
 0.050  (0.021)
-0.035  (0.022)
 0.002  (0.029)
 0.011  (0.022)
 0.032  (0.025)
-0.025  (0.026)












 0.043  (0.041)
 0.056  (0.035)
 0.031  (0.024)
 0.016  (0.022)
 0.152  (0.036)
 0.053  (0.023)
 0.032  (0.018)
Notes: Standard Errors in Round Parentheses45
Table C3:  Unemployed Sample, Marshallian  Demands, Reduced Form Estimates 
Food At Home Clothing Expenditure Total Expenditure
Constant
Potential Benefits X lagged assets
Potential Benefits X lagged no Assets
Importance of Lost Income         
Completed High School   
College
Age      




male, spouse employed at separation
female, spouse employed at separation
male, spouse not employed at separation
female, spouse not employed at separation 
Atlantic 
Quebec   
Prairies         
British Columbia
















Weeks, Separation to Interview         
Local Unemployment Rate
Total Expenditure
Household Income, 1 year previous
Household Income, 2 years previous 
Respondent Income, 1 year previous
Respondent Income, 2 years previous         
Hhld Inc. previous yr, squared
Hhld Inc. 2 yrs previous, squared    
Ln(earnings in lost job)
ln(earnings in lost job) squared 



























































































































Notes: Standard Errors in Round Parentheses.46
TABLE C.4:  Employed Sample, Marshallian  Demands, Reduced Form Estimates 
Food At Home Clothing Expenditure Total Expenditure
Constant
Potential Benefits  X lagged assets
Potential Benefits  X lagged no Assets
Importance of Lost Income         
Completed High School   
College
Age      




male, spouse employed at separation
female, spouse employed at separation
male, spouse not employed at separation
female, spouse not employed at separation 
Atlantic 
Quebec   
Prairies         
British Columbia















Weeks, Separation to Interview         
Local Unemployment Rate
Total Expenditure
Household Income, 1 year previous
Household Income, 2 years previous 
Respondent Income, 1 year previous
Respondent Income, 2 years previous         
Hhld Inc. previous yr, squared
Hhld Inc. 2 yrs previous, squared    
Ln(earnings in lost job)
ln(earnings in lost job) squared 

























































































































Notes: Standard Errors in Round Parentheses.